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Recent studies suggest that allowing individuals to choose their partners can help to maintain
cooperation in human social networks; this behaviour can supplement behavioural reciprocity,
whereby humans are inﬂuenced to cooperate by peer pressure. However, it is unknown
how the rate of forming and breaking social ties affects our capacity to cooperate. Here we
use a series of online experiments involving 1,529 unique participants embedded in 90
experimental networks, to show that there is a ‘Goldilocks’ effect of network dynamism on
cooperation. When the rate of change in social ties is too low, subjects choose to have many
ties, even if they attach to defectors. When the rate is too high, cooperators cannot detach
from defectors as much as defectors re-attach and, hence, subjects resort to behavioural
reciprocity and switch their behaviour to defection. Optimal levels of cooperation are
achieved at intermediate levels of change in social ties.
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ecent theoretical attention has focused on the role that
population structure might have in the emergence of
cooperation1–3. This work suggests that cooperation can be
maintained when individuals are situated within a social network,
interacting repeatedly with their immediate neighbours. The
expectation is that cooperators will form mutually reinforcing
clusters, which helps them to outcompete defectors4–6. Yet,
empirical work has found that static network structure has little, if
any, effect on promoting cooperation7–10.
In contrast, dynamic networks that allow individuals to adjust
social ties are able to maintain cooperation8,11. One reason is that
dynamic networks offer an additional method of responding to
the past actions of others; not only can players reciprocate by
strategically changing their own cooperation behaviour (thus
collectively increasing or decreasing the overall levels of
cooperation evinced in the group as a whole) but they can
also change their network ties, engaging in ‘tie reciprocity’11,12.
Agent-based simulations show that dynamic networks favour
cooperation under a wider range of assumptions about costs and
beneﬁts than static networks do6,13.
As a result, there is growing interest in studying the
coevolutionary dynamics of strategic behaviours and tie forma-
tion6,14–17. In these evolutionary models, positive feedback effects
can result from preferential partner choice, where cooperative
individuals keep attracting new partnerships and defecting
individuals lose ties. This kind of social selection pressure can
reinforce cooperation in the network, as shown by these models.
However, prior theoretical work offers conﬂicting predictions
about how cooperation will vary with the rate at which social ties
may be formed or broken (the ‘rewiring rate’). Some recent
theoretical (and also empirical) work shows that when individuals
are allowed to rewire their networks more frequently, they are
more likely to maintain cooperation6,11,16,18, suggesting that
more frequent rewiring is always better. However, other work17
suggests that too high a rewiring rate could compromise
cooperation. The theorized reason is that, although very high
turnover in ties helps cooperators to cut ties with defectors, it can
also diminish the chance of converting such defectors into
cooperators by social inﬂuence or learning19; moreover, a very
high turnover rate can provide relatively more opportunities for
defectors to re-attach to cooperators than for cooperators to
detach from defectors.
Here we test these competing theoretical predictions by
leveraging new tools for running economic games and conducting
experiments online20,21. We ﬁnd that there is a ‘Goldilocks’ effect
of network dynamism on cooperation. When the rate of change in
social ties is too low, subjects choose to have many ties, even if they
attach to defectors; and when the rate is too high, cooperators
cannot detach from defectors as much as defectors re-attach, and
so subjects indeed resort to behavioural reciprocity and switch
their behaviour to defection. Optimal levels of cooperation are
achieved at intermediate levels of change in social ties.
Results
Structure of online experiments. There is burgeoning interest in
using online tools to create virtual labs to evaluate human
behaviour11,21–23. The advantages are many, including the ability
to recruit large samples quickly and the ease of conducting many
replicates of experimental treatments. Using novel software and
recruiting subjects from around the world to a virtual lab via the
online labour market Amazon Mechanical Turk24–28, we were
able to conduct a series of experiments that spanned the whole
range of possible rewiring rates.
We recruited 1,529 unique participants who were randomly
assigned to one of nine conditions in a series of 90 realizations of
our dynamic network experiments. Each participant was initially
assigned a location in a random social network and then given a
choice: either cooperate or defect. Participants who cooperate
pay 50 units for each network neighbour and each of their
neighbours receive 100 units. Participants who defect pay 0 units
and their neighbours receive 0 units (each subject’s ﬁnal score
accumulated over all rounds was converted into dollars at an
exchange rate of $1¼1,000 units.) Before making each decision,
participants were shown their neighbours and (after the ﬁrst
round) the neighbours’ previous decisions. They were only
allowed to use the same strategy (cooperation or defection)
simultaneously with all neighbours; this feature, of course, makes
it harder to maintain cooperation because participants are more
likely to use a conditional strategy and switch to defection29.A t
the end of each turn, participants were informed about the
decisions of their neighbours in that round, along with their own
payoff. These interactions were repeated for 15 rounds; to prevent
ﬁnal-round effects, we did not inform participants how many
rounds would be played. Individuals were not allowed to
participate in the experiment more than once (see Methods and
Supplementary Fig. S1).
Before each run of the experiment, we created a random social
network with each possible connection among participants being
realized with probability 0.2. Thereafter, at each round, partici-
pants chose whether or not to cooperate, and a ﬁxed percentage of
participant pairs were chosen at random in which one individual
in the pair (also chosen at random) was allowed to decide whether
to form a new tie if one did not exist or to cut a tie if one did exist
(this percentage is the ‘rewiring rate’). In all pairs, the deciding
participant was informed of the other’s choice to cooperate or
defect in the preceding round. At the end of every rewiring
opportunity, each participant was told the number of others who
chose to break links with him or her and the number of others who
formed new links with him or her. This being said, both the
formation and the termination of social ties are unilateral within
each round in our experiments (and different results could have
been obtained if forming a new tie required mutual agreement);
however, subjects can detach from newly attached alters in future
rounds, when given the chance. Notably, throughout the whole
experiment, our study was designed to examine how cooperation
can be maintained in dynamic, evolving social networks which
have roughly the same size but which were degree heterogeneous
because of (preferential) partner switching.
We tested nine different rewiring rates: 0, 5, 10, 30, 50, 70, 80,
90 and 100%. At higher rewiring rates, a larger fraction of the
links can potentially be altered, leading to faster updating of social
ties. Note that subjects were not informed of the exact rewiring
rate of the sessions in which they participated. We conducted 10
experiments for each rewiring rate for a total of 90 sessions (see
Methods); the average network size was 17 (s.d.¼4) and there
was no signiﬁcant difference among rewiring rates (P¼0.35,
analysis of variance). The average initial percentage of cooperative
players was 65% (s.d.¼11%) and there was also no signiﬁcant
difference among rewiring rates (P¼0.99, analysis of variance).
‘Goldilocks’ effect of network dynamism on cooperation.
Figure 1a shows the cooperation rate across rounds for four of the
nine rewiring rates. Whereas the slope visibly declines in the
experiments with rewiring rates of 0, 30 and 100%, it remains
relatively steady at the rewiring rate of 70% (see Supplementary
Figs S2–S4, and Supplementary Note 1 for the results presented
in Fig. 1). We also examined the strategy selection data across
rewiring rates using a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM)30
with ﬁxed effects for period and random effects for individuals.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the network rewiring
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1038/ncomms3814
2 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS|4:2814|DOI: 10.1038/ncomms3814|www.nature.com/naturecommunications
& 2013 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved.rate and cooperation. Controlling for period, there is a peak at the
70% rewiring rate (Supplementary Table S1). Dynamic partner
selection favours cooperation; however, at very high rewiring
rates, consistent with one set of prior theoretical predictions17,i t
has an adverse effect on cooperation.
In these experiments, participants’ connections and strategy
both change. Figure 1b shows network density, which is deﬁned
as the ratio of the number of existing connections to the number
of all possible connections, for different rewiring rates. Every
density (except, of course, for the 0% rewiring rate) approaches
an asymptotic value between 60 and 70%, but the length of time it
takes for this to happen varies by the update rate. For instance, at
high rewiring rates, the density dramatically increases in the
initial rounds and then stays roughly constant. We call the initial
rounds the ‘pre-stable’ state and the later rounds the ‘stable’ state;
we determined the number of rounds needed to transition from
the pre-stable and the stable state for each rewiring rate
(Supplementary Table S2 and Supplementary Fig. S5). Modelling
of the transition from the pre-stable to the stable state shows that
sessions with a 10% rewiring rate reach a stable density at round
9, whereas sessions with 90% or 100% rewiring rates do so at the
very ﬁrst round (Supplementary Fig. S4). Note that this transition
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starts at a similar initial value of B65% cooperators. Sessions with a 70% rewiring rate show the greatest maintenance of cooperation. (b) Network
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Figure 2 | Average change in rates of cooperation by round. Estimates
based on GLMM, incorporating ﬁxed effects for individual strategy choice
and random effects for session and individual. The error bars are s.e.
(N0%¼161, N5%¼203, N10%¼165, N30%¼153, N50%¼184, N70%¼157,
N80%170, N90%¼172 and N100%¼179). Note that the relationship peaks at
a 70% rewiring rate, suggesting that moderate rates of social change
in the network (rather than low or high) are optimal for cooperation.
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from the rate at which ties can be rewired (which is under
experimental control). Other analyses (Supplementary Fig. S6)
show that, by round 15, cooperators tend to have higher degree
and to be more central in the network compared with defectors,
across rewiring rates. Figure 1c illustrates the different appearance
the networks assume, along with the greatest percentage of
cooperation seen at the 70% rewiring rate.
Shift from quantity to quality in partner choice. The transition
to the stable state appears to be related to a shift from quantity to
quality in partner choice, because participants increasingly
become picky about the cooperativeness of potential partners and
prefer linking to cooperators rather than defectors. Note that in
the various rewiring rates, the probability of choosing to connect
to a defector is higher in the pre-stable state than in the stable
state (Fig. 3). During this initial phase in which partnerships are
scarce resources, participants try to gain new connections as
much as possible, whenever given the chance to do so, even
agreeing to link to those who defected in the past round. How-
ever, this changes as participants acquire more ties. Participants
increasingly refuse connections with defectors, and they
(especially defectors) also break more existing connections with
defectors. As a result, they maintain the same number of
connections while attempting to increase the fraction of those
connections that is with cooperators.
Arms race of attachment and detachment. The crucial beha-
viour occurs in the links between cooperators and defectors (CD
links). The probability of making and breaking such links changes
across rounds over the course of each session, and the relative rate
of making and breaking such links varies according to the overall
rewiring rate (Fig. 4). At low rewiring rates, the number of
newly formed CD links increases across rounds, evincing a
‘quantity-over-quality’ style of game play. As a result, cooperators
increasingly become connected to defectors; this in turn increases
the likelihood that a cooperator will subsequently change strategy
to defection (Fig. 5). At intermediate rewiring rates, the relative
number of newly detached CD links rises higher than attached
links across rounds, which can help cooperators to maintain their
strategy and provides continuous feedback to defectors (because
they are subject to detachment). However, at very high rewiring
rates, cooperators who have become attached to many defectors
in the initial rounds rapidly reduce their connections to defectors
when given the chance to do so in later rounds. Meanwhile,
defectors continue to re-attach to cooperators, which ultimately
causes cooperators to switch to defection, as shown by the overall
rate of cooperation declining (see Supplementary Note 2 for
details). Only rewiring rates between 70% and 90% allow co-
operators to keep detaching from defectors to a greater extent
than the defectors can re-attach, helping to explain why co-
operation is optimized in those sessions.
Discussion
Our ﬁndings comport with one set of theoretical results that
counterintuitively predict that cooperation will not rise
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These results are grouped by behaviour: whether the ‘sender’ and
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15,832, NbreakC4D¼9,905, NbreakD4C¼9,842 and NbreakD4D¼10,843).
Participants connect to cooperators at a constant rate, but they are less
likely to make connections to defectors and more likely to break
connections to defectors in the stable state, suggesting that they shift from
quantity to quality over the course of the experiment.
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Figure 4 | ‘Arms race’ of making and breaking ties between cooperators
and defectors. (a) Change in the ratio of detached to attached links between
cooperators and defectors for low (30%), intermediate (70%), and high
rewiring rates (100%). The time-averaged ratio across the full range of
rewiring rates is shown in b. The error bars are s.d. (N¼13). For low rewiring
rates, new CD links are formed more often than existing CD links are
dissolved. Cooperators become increasingly surrounded by defectors as a
result, and cooperation in the group declines. At intermediate rewiring rates
(for example, 70%), cooperators can more effectively shun defectors and,
thus, cooperation is maintained in the group. At a 100% rewiring rate,
however, the detachment rate drops compared with the attachment rate,
which explains why cooperation is optimized in those sessions.
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the actual peak occurs (at 70% in the present study) that is
important here, but rather the fact that the overall curve has a
parabolic shape. There is a kind of arms race of attaching and
detaching between cooperators and defectors that affects actors’
cooperative behaviour.
The achievement of a maximum level of cooperation in the
group at an intermediate rewiring rate can be understood as
follows. Under low rewiring rates, cooperators at times
unselectively attach to and/or fail to detach from defectors,
presumably in the hope that these defectors would, via
behavioural reciprocity, be converted into cooperators and
reciprocate in later rounds. Defectors, on the other hand, almost
always capitalize on rewiring opportunities exclusively to attach
to cooperators (Fig. 3). Still, defectors are unavoidably faced with
the threat of losing existing ties, whereas some cooperators keep
gaining new ties. This feedback helps to maintain cooperation in
dynamic social networks. As the rewiring rate rises above a
threshold (B70% in the present study), however, cooperators are
increasingly overwhelmed by defectors who persistently chase
after them. Thus, at very high rewiring rates (for instance, at a
100% rewiring rate), cooperators are outpaced by defectors in the
arms race of detaching and attaching links. Even though
cooperators can swiftly break the connections with defectors
during the initial few rounds, they simply run short of the
opportunity necessary to cut all links to defectors in later rounds
(Fig. 4 and Supplementary Figs S7 and S8). Hence, some
conditional cooperators give up and, as they cannot cut their ties
to defectors, instead reciprocate by defecting. Thus, the overall
cooperation in the group is compromised at high rewiring rates.
Moreover, it is worth noting that there is a type of permanent
or parasitic defector who intends to take advantage of cooperators
from the very beginning. These defectors, who appear to be
unaffected by losing ties (see Supplementary Fig. S9), have an
adverse role in reducing cooperation at very high rewiring rates.
In our experiments, a certain number of subjects stick with
defection no matter how their neighbours respond. When
cooperators run short of the opportunities to detach, defection
starts spreading from these subjects having this parasitic strategy
to those individuals who are conditional cooperators. In light of
this, we might have observed different results if subjects had the
means (for example, information) to discriminate reciprocal
defection from an immutable, permanent sort of defection.
This tug-of-war is a result of the fact that, in our experiment,
we permit unilateral link formation; if bilateral link formation
were used (and both parties had to agree to make, or break, a tie),
our results would likely be different. Indeed, our results may be
contrasted with a prior experiment that found a linear relation-
ship between rewiring rates and cooperation but that also
involved bilateral tie formation18. There are two main reasons
for using the unilateral link formation in our work: theory
veriﬁcation and experimental practicality. First, our experiments
were designed to verify predictions made by theoretical studies,
which most often assume unilateral partner choice. Second, using
bilateral link formation makes it difﬁcult to keep participants in a
game; such experiments often suffer from time-out issues because
participants need to make each decision for every attempted
partnership, in particular when the rewiring rate is high18.
However, by using unilateral choice, participants can make
decisions easily and quickly and, in contrast to experiments
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Figure 5 | Intermediate network rewiring rates promote reciprocal
cooperation. (a) The probability of subjects switching their current strategy
depends on cooperation levels among their neighbours. The dots are
expectation values, the error bars represent 95% conﬁdence intervals, and
the solid lines are the estimated probability functions by GLMM
incorporating random effects for sessions and individuals (red line:
N¼10,866, Po0.01; blue line: N¼9,341, Po0.01). The intersections
between the horizontal line and the estimated probability lines mark the
threshold level of cooperation among neighbours at which individuals
switch their current strategies with 50% chance. Cooperators are more
likely to change to defection when the cooperation ratio among neighbours
is 441.7%, whereas defectors are more likely to change to cooperating
when the cooperation ratio among neighbours exceeds 86.0%. Panels b–d
show how the fractions of subjects who are more likely to switch to the
opposite strategies change with respect to game rounds for different
rewiring rates of 30%, 70%, and 100%, respectively. The arms race of
attachment and detachment, as shown in Fig. 4, has an impact on strategy
updates of subjects; only at intermediate rewiring rates does the proportion
of defectors who are more likely to switch to cooperation exceed that of
cooperators more likely to switch to defection.
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in the middle of a session (see Supplementary Fig. S10). Since, in
most real circumstances, people form new partnerships via
mutual consent, partner-searching strategies are another area that
needs to be further investigated. Nevertheless, to circumvent these
difﬁculties, in our experimental setup, potential new ties were
formed via random matching. Cooperators, if they are asked to
determine whether to form a new link, could still condition their
choice on the past behaviour of potential partners, and defectors
had opportunities to chase after cooperators. From this point of
view, our work examines how cooperation can be sustained
through a tug-of-war of attachment and detachment. This tug-of-
war-like process also has a substantial impact on the topological
features of the emergent partner networks. We ﬁnd that higher
rewiring rates result in higher ultimate degree, and that
cooperators have more central network positions than defectors
in all experimental regimes (see Supplementary Fig. S6).
Our experimental setup differs from this prior experiment18 in
other ways that may have affected the results, beyond the
necessity of bilateral tie formation. For example, in that
experiment, the 108 experimental subjects were allowed to
participate in multiple sessions; thus, a learning effect across
trials could be a confounder of the results; in our experiments, we
restrict subjects to only one session, thus minimizing or
eliminating any such learning effect.
Cutting ties to defectors in dynamic networks can be seen as a
form of social punishment. This is a different approach than
conventional costly punishment (in which the punisher pays a
cost to punish the target) that is often explored in such studies, as
it does not involve explicit costs. Still, similar to tit-for-tat in
repeated prisoner’s dilemma games, this sort of social punishment
based on dynamic linking may have an impact by inducing
people who have their ties cut to cooperate in later rounds
(Fig. 5c). Allowing individuals to punish defectors (even when it
is costly to the punisher) can promote cooperation31–36, but it
reduces the payoffs of both parties and can be used against
cooperators as well as defectors37–43. Cutting ties, on the other
hand, is not costly when used against defectors and it is not
typically used against cooperators, which makes it an attractive
alternative means of maintaining cooperation.
These types of experiments, on this scale, would be very hard to
conduct ofﬂine19,44,45, and thus our work also illustrates a
broader movement to develop methods to conduct experiments
online11,21–23. Moreover, the deployment of standardized
software tools affords the advantages of allowing rapid
replication of results such as ours, and furthermore affords the
opportunity to explore how changes in the experimental setup or
the relevant parameters might affect the outcome in ways that are
practically or theoretically informative.
Finally, our dynamic network experiments are also related to
experiments with ostracism45–47, which allow groups to use
various voting systems to punish individuals by ejecting them
from the group. However, in our experiments, breaking links
represents a form of decentralized ostracism, where participants
make their own decisions about whom to exclude from the
beneﬁts of individual cooperation. Our experiments suggest that
ostracism need not be coordinated to be effective, but there may
be constraints in social systems that are required to make it work.
In particular, it may be important to constrain the rate at which
people choose whether or not to maintain relationships to
maximize the likelihood that cooperation can endure.
Our ﬁndings have implications for how one might approach
the formation or management of online or ofﬂine groups.
Permitting or fostering intermediate rates of partner choice may
be key to sustaining cooperation (or other properties, such as
engagement) in groups or may be related to the ability of groups
to evince other desirable traits, such as smoking cessation in
online quit networks48 or cooperation or innovation in networks
of employees in workplaces49. Network rewiring may even be
crucial to the continued existence of groups50.
In sum, allowing individuals to dynamically update their social
network connections can stabilize cooperation in large groups
where cooperation is difﬁcult to maintain solely through
traditional reciprocation via changes in cooperative behaviour—
but only up to a point. Social institutions that create inertia in
social ties may, in fact, act to support cooperation by reducing the
extent to which rewiring is possible in circumstances in which
social interactions are overly ﬂuid.
Methods
Recruitment procedure. A total of 1,529 subjects participated in our incentivized
economic game experiments. Subjects were recruited using Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk)21,24–28. MTurk is an online labour market in which employers
contract with workers to complete short tasks for relatively small amounts of
money. Workers often receive a baseline payment, plus an additional bonus
depending on their performance. Thus, incentivized experiments are easy to
conduct using MTurk: the baseline payment corresponds to the traditional ‘show-
up fee’ and the bonus payment is determined by the number of points earned
during the experimental session.
A number of recent studies have demonstrated the validity of behavioural
experiment data gathered using MTurk. Most pertinent to our study are two direct
replications using economic games. The ﬁrst shows quantitative agreement in
contribution behaviour in a repeated public goods game between experiments
conducted in the physical lab and those conducted using MTurk with
approximately tenfold lower stakes27. The second replication again found
quantitative agreement between the lab and MTurk, with respect to cooperation in
a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma21. It has also been shown that MTurk subjects are
as attentive as undergraduates26, consistent in their answers to a range of survey
questions24,25,27, and signiﬁcantly more nationally representative24, and that a
range of classic psychological manipulations and biases are apparent among
MTurk subjects21,24.
Experimental setup. Our participants interacted anonymously over the internet
using customized software playable in a browser window20. Subjects were not
allowed to participate in more than one session of the experiment. In all, 90
sessions were conducted from January to April 2012. To clearly observe the effects
of different rewiring rates while keeping other initial conditions the same, we
completed ten sessions for each rewiring rate according to the following thresholds:
network size is 410, retention rate is 475% and initial cooperative subject
percentage was between 40% and 85%. As a result, 90 sessions were completed,
with an average of 17.0 participants at the start of each session. Each session lasted
B1.5h on average. The game lasted 15 rounds, but subjects were not told this, and
the game ending was sudden. In each session, the subjects were paid a $3 show-up
fee; each subject’s ﬁnal score summed over all rounds was converted into dollars at
an exchange rate of $1¼1,000 points. This research was approved by the Harvard
University Committee on the Use of Human Subjects.
The initial environment consisted of a countdown timer of 20min. When this
time had elapsed, a ‘Go’ button became visible and the participants were required
to click it to participate. Upon clicking, subjects were taken to a website external to
MTurk, designed for the experiments. For each experiment, each subject was asked
to take a tutorial after which the actual game would begin. If a subject did not click
‘Go’ and enter our customized website within 40s, they were dropped from the
game. If they did not complete the tutorial within 420s, they were dropped. After
420s of the tutorial beginning, all participants who completed the tutorial began
the game. At any point during the game, if a subject was inactive for 20s they were
warned about being dropped. If they still remained inactive after 40s, they were
dropped.
Only 152 out of 1,529 total subjects were dropped at some point after
beginning their games and the dropout rate did not vary signiﬁcantly across
different rewiring rates except for 0%, which had a lower dropout rate
(Supplementary Fig. S10).
Statistical model of cooperation and density change. Analysing the data from
our experiment (for example, Supplementary Fig. S3) requires more than an
analysis of mere average values. For instance, the average values by round do not
represent directly the slopes of the change through a session. Moreover, ratio data
represented as the cooperation rate, which is limited to be between 0 and 1, does
not come from a population that is normally distributed. In addition, multiple
observations from the same subject and observations from multiple subjects within
the same session are not independent. Thus, we need to deal with the nested
structure of errors in our statistical analysis.
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1038/ncomms3814
6 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS|4:2814|DOI: 10.1038/ncomms3814|www.nature.com/naturecommunications
& 2013 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved.Hence, we used a statistical analysis based on a GLMM involving logistic
regression with nested random effects30. GLMM estimates coefﬁcients in the linear
predictor and random effects, which comes from individual differences, at the same
time, using the maximum-likelihood methods. To be concrete, here is how the
model was implemented to get the statistical results on strategy selection in Fig. 2:
let pi,w denote the probability of player i selecting cooperation in the session with
rewiring rate w; let x be the round number of the session; and let g0,i, g1,i denote the
random effects nested within the experimental session player i belongs to. Then, we
have
pi;w¼1=f1þexpð zi;wÞg ð1Þ
zi;w¼b0 þg0;i þðb1;w þg1;iÞxþei;w  ð2Þ
In the terminology of GLMM, equation (1) is called the ‘link function’ and
equation (2) is termed the ‘linear predictor.’ Here, we used a logistic function as the
link function because the response variable p is assumed to obey the binominal
distribution. The random effects g can be approximated by the normal distribution
with mean value zero. Using maximum-likelihood methods to minimize the
random error e, we then estimated the b coefﬁcients that represent the ﬁxed effect
of the rewiring rate w. In this way, the model allows us to estimate the b coefﬁcients
in the linear predictor while taking into account random effects due to individual
variation. All analysis was performed using R version 2.14.1.
We calculated the probability of subjects selecting cooperation by round using
the foregoing model. The estimated values are shown in Supplementary Table S1.
Figure 2 showed the coefﬁcients b1 in Supplementary Table S1 as a level of
cooperation change. From the statistical model, we see that the dependence of
cooperation on the rewiring rate is not monotonic but shows a peak around a 70%
rewiring rate.
It is not appropriate to estimate the levels of density change across all rounds,
because the changing rate is not time dependent (Supplementary Fig. S4). For
instance, at high rewiring rates the density dramatically increases in the initial
rounds and then stays roughly constant. We call the former the ‘pre-stable state’
and the later the ‘stable state’. We determined the number of rounds needed to
transition from the pre-stable and the stable state for each rewiring rate. The
method is to apply GLMM with logistic regression by group of three or four
consecutive rounds. The results are shown in Supplementary Table S2. When the
estimated slope is not signiﬁcantly different compared with the ﬁrst set, we
concluded that the network had reached the stable state. The critical number of
rounds for different rewiring rates is shown in Supplementary Fig. S5. We see that
the density reaches the stable state faster with increasing rewiring rate.
Statistical model of reciprocity. Each subject has to make a choice between
cooperation and defection every round. Subjects are informed of previous strategies
of their neighbours at this time. Figure 5a shows that the previous strategies of
neighbours affect the future choice of the focal player. The lines in Fig. 5a are
probability functions P(m) estimated by GLMM incorporating random effects for
sessions and individuals. P(m) is a logistic function
PðmÞ¼1=½1þexpð b1  b2mÞ  ð3Þ
where m is the ratio of cooperative players among neighbours (the terms of the
random effects are omitted in the equation (3) for clarity). The estimated ﬁxed
effects coefﬁcients for changing from cooperation to defection are b1¼2.06 and
b2¼ 4.94, and those for changing from defection to cooperation are b1¼ 2.15
and b2¼2.50. Using the estimated coefﬁcients, we can calculate the threshold level
of cooperation among neighbours such that average subjects switch strategy with
50% chance by
m50% strategy switching¼ b1=b2: ð4Þ
From equation (4), subjects change from cooperation to defection with 50%
chance when m is 41.7% and from defection to cooperation when m is 86.0%.
Cooperators are less likely to remain cooperative with increasing numbers of
neighbours who defected. On the other hand, defectors are more likely to change
their strategy with an increasing cooperation level among their neighbours. These
phenomena are called ‘strategy reciprocity’, and they contribute to a cascade of
cooperation or defection in the static network. A subject’s decision can inﬂuence
the whole network by affecting the cooperation probability of his neighbours.
Notably, the probability of cooperators changing into defectors is, on average,
higher and more sensitive to the cooperativity of neighbours than that of defectors
changing to cooperators. This means defection is favoured over cooperation
(if subjects do not also have opportunities to change their neighbours).
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